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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND INVISIBLE JUSTICE 
Mary Murphy Schroeder* 
The past decade has seen an ever-rising and advancing tide of appellate 
cases. The courts are meeting that tide with elaborate and formidable 
flood control systems. 
In the midst of this furious activity, Professors Carrington, Meador, 
and Rosenberg have thoughtfully and creatively analyzed the new prob-
lems facing the courts and the devices which have been or could be used 
to meet them.' The main body of their work addresses specific procedural 
areas, such as use of centralized staff, enlarging courts, and the special 
needs of criminal appeals. The work in many ways complements the 
important contribution of the American Bar Association in its Standards 
Relating to Appellate Courts. 2 
However, in the opening chapter the authors of Justice on Appeal stand 
back to reflect upon the essential purposes of our appellate justice system 
and our means of achieving them. When the authors analyze the "func-
tions and imperatives" of the system, they give particular attention to 
what they term the "individuality" of the appellate judge. 
Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg sound a warning deserving 
amplification: appellate courts must not become faceless institutions. 
Judges must be "identifiable" and must "take personal responsibility for 
the appellate court's decision. " 3 Many recent court practices, aimed at 
efficiency in handling volume and protection of judges' time, undercut the 
identifiability and visibility of the judges themselves and jeopardize the 
imperative of individuality. 
My theme here is the conflict between the visibility of the appellate 
judge and recent procedural changes designed to cope with the quantum 
leaps in the numbers and complexity of cases. I will develop that theme, 
*Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals. B.A., 1962, Swarthmore College; J.D., 1965, University 
of Chicago. 
I P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL]. 
2 ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING 
TO APPELLATE COURTS (1977), [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. Another major, 
recent analysis of appellate judicial administration of appellate courts is R. LEFLAR, IN-
TERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS (1976). A special ABA Task 
Force on appellate procedure has developed a manual on the methodology of appellate 
reform expected to be published this fall. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
System has some illuminating insights into the bar's perception of the need for openness and 
visibility in the courts. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE 
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, A 
PRELIMINARY REPORT 144-68 (1975). 
3 JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 8-9. 
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first, by suggesting the ways that three of the major controls on the 
system, namely the selection, evaluation, and discipline of judges, depend 
upon the exercise of recognizable and individual judicial responsibility; 
second, by illustrating how this "imperative" can be undermined if de-
vices intended to cope with increased volume are adopted without vigi-
lance; and finally by pointing up some approaches to permit courts to 
adjust to the demands of volume while retaining visible individual respon-
sibility for decisions. 
I. VISIBILITY OF JUDGES 
I begin with the fundamental notion that the purpose of the judicial 
system is to make decisions, and that no matter how sophisticated the 
institutional apparatus, the decisions must be made by people. 
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe Pound 
remarked, "men count more than machinery." Assume the clearest 
rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most sophisticated court 
techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In the long run, "There is 
no guarantee of justice except the personality of the judge." The 
reason the judge makes or breaks the system of justice is that rules are 
not self-declaring or self-applying. Even in a government of laws, men 
make the decisions. 4 
If our system is necessarily dependent upon imperfect human beings, 
then there must also be certain institutional checks on the exercise of 
power to help insure that it is exercised with restraint, without arbitrari-
ness, and in an impartial, informed, and honest way. To give obvious 
examples, we now almost universally require that appellate judges be 
trained in the law with long years of experience, that decisions be limited 
to the actual cases and controversies which litigants bring to the court, 
that appellate justice be administered not by one judge but by a panel of at 
least three, each of whom must take a position openly as part of a 
continuing chronicle of individual performance. Under traditional prac-
tice at least, fundamental institutional checks on performance of judges 
have been provided by what Karl Llewellyn described as ''those strange 
and beautiful institutions, the signed opinion and the recorded vote. " 5 
The value of the visible judge is evident not only in the decisional 
process itself, but in related fields of judicial administration: the methods 
by which we select, evaluate, and discipline judges. 
• Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainab/e?, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1063 
(1966) (footnotes omitted). 
• K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 35 (1960). 
Llewellyn develops a list of institutional factors which steady appellate decision making. 
Visibility is an attribute of many of his factors. Id. at 35-61. 
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A. Judicial Selection 
Concern in this area is mounting. The principal controversy in recent 
years has been whether state judges should be selected by the electorate 
among competing individuals for the job or whether judges should be 
appointed through a process known as "merit selection" which guaran-
tees security of tenure approximating the federal mode. A key argument 
in favor of direct, contested elections assumes that it is of value for judges 
themselves to face popular judgment and to have their records exposed to 
public scrutiny. A strong argument against contested elections is the 
importance of freeing judges from public pressures and giving them se-
curity to increase their freedom to exercise independent and impartial 
judgment. 6 The concern with selection has spilled over into the federal 
sphere where a system of screening applicants by merit selection commis-
sions has recently been instituted.7 
The measure of any method of judicial selection depends upon the 
judges themselves and upon an identifiable record of performance. A 
faceless judiciary cannot conceivably be assessed by any sort of popular 
election, whether contested or "on the record" under merit selection. A 
system in which judges are appointed with maximum security of tenure 
and then retreat from public view is disquieting. Without visibility of 
judges, we can never know how well the selection processes are working: 
any discussion about which system produces better judges becomes vac-
uous speculation. 
B. Evaluation of Judges 
As an increasing number of states have done away with contested 
judicial elections, ·there has been a developing interest in methods to 
evaluate judicial performance in some objective manner. This is because 
most merit selection plans call for judges to stand against their own 
records at periodic intervals. 
The loss to the system, whether real or imagined, resulting from the 
abolition of contested elections has given rise to bar polls. These polls are 
attempts by a presumably informed group to assess individual judges' 
6 For a general discussion of the historic background of this controversy, see Winters, 
Selection of Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1966). See also 
Burnett, Observations on the Direct-Election Method of Judicial Selection, 44 Tux. L. REv. 
1098 (1966); Schroeder & Hall, Twenty-five Years' Experience with Merit Judicial Selection 
in Missouri, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1088 (1966). For a collection of articles on the subject, see G. 
WINTERS, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE (1973). 
7 By Executive Order, President Carter recently created nominating commissions for 
vacancies occurring in the Courts of Appeals. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 42 Fed. Reg. %59 
(1977). The system is discussed in 63 A.B.A.J. 909 (1977). 
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performance on the bench.8 While we have always had some informal and 
amorphous methods of evaluating appellate judges, principally by law 
review commentary on appellate court opinions and by the general 
acknowledgment of judicial reputation in the legal community, these 
formal polls of lawyers to rate judges' performance are recent develop-
ments in mostjurisdictions.9 My concern here is not with whether polls 
are good or bad, with what distribution they should have, or with the 
problems of framing criterja. 10 Regardless of their virtues or faults, they 
represent a conspicuous response to the felt need to rate the performance 
of judges. 11 
Yet fewer jurisdictions have attempted to evaluate appellate judges 
than trialjudges. 12 While there are, no doubt, a variety ofreasons for this, 
they must include the fact that appellate judges are already far less visible 
and more isolated than trial court judges, making rating more difficult. In 
Arizona, the committee devising the poll wished responses only from 
lawyers who practiced before the judges being rated. However, because 
of the small number of lawyers who actually appear before appellate 
judges in a given year, the committee decided that the respondents could 
evaluate appellate judges if the lawyer was familiar with the opinions of 
the judge. 13 
The only measures which the bar can apply to the evaluation of appel-
late judges are, like the measures applied to trial courts, dependent upon 
the identifiability of the judge. The bar must be able to observe the judge 
and must be able to assume that judges are'taking personal responsibility 
for the decisions of the court. In order to determine whether a judge has 
an impartial attitude, the polls inevitably must look to the visible perform-
ance of the jµdge during oral argument and the manner in which written 
8 It is widely recognized that the bar should have some role in evaluating judicial perform-
ance. 
Whatever method of judicial selection is used, the legal profession should under-
take an advisory and educational role in the selection process. Acting through 
professional associations at the local and state levels, the bar should ascertain 
professional opinion concerning the qualifications of those who may be considered 
for judicial office and should seek to make its judgment known and influential. 
Where elections for judicial office are held, preferential polls among the mem-
bers of the bar may be appropriate where their opinion is informed by regular 
involvement in court proceedings. 
ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
COURT' ADMINISTRATION, § l.21, at 49-50 (1974). 
9 D. MADDI, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE POLLS 3 (1977). 
1° For some analysis of these problems, see id.; see also PHILLIP, How BAR Assoc1A-
TIONS EVALUATE SITTING JUDGES (1976); Jenkins, Retention Elections: Who Wins When 
No One Loses?, 61 JuD. 79 (1977). 
11 A recent study of bar polls concludes they may have little effect on public opinion in 
elections; judges condemned by lawyers in bar polls still are· retained by the electorate. 
Jenkins, supra note 10. Independent of the impact that such polls have on the voters, they 
may have considerable influence on the judges themselves and on those responsible for 
appointing future judges. 
12 A recent study for the American Bar Foundation of bar polls in 14jurisdictions revealed 
that only three attempted to evaluate appellate judges. The jurisdictions were Arizona, 
Dallas, and Florida. D. MADDI, supra note 10. 
_
13 Slavin, Judicial Evaluation in Arizona, 12 ARIZ. B. J. 41, 42 (August 1976). See also 
Cameron, Merit Selection in Arizona-The First Two Years, 1976 Ariz. St. L. J. 425. 
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decisions are set forth. To determine whether the judge is diligently 
performing his duties, the bar can see whether the judge appears with 
punctuality and attentiveness at oral argument but can do little more than 
guess whether the judge is taking responsibility for a fair share of deci-
sions. The appellate judge's knowledge of the law and grasp of the 
contentions of the parties is knowable only by examination of the judge's 
written decisions and the nature of the questions asked during oral argu-
ment. 
C. Judicial Discipline 
Related to the problems of evaluating judicial performance are the 
problems of disciplining or removing judges, who perform badly, or who 
through disabilities are not performing at all. This, too, is an area oflively 
current interest. 
The states have developed a variety of methods of judicial discipline. 14 
Development of standards for judicial discipline and disability is under 
way .15 There are currently a number of proposals in Congress to create 
systems other than the present constitutional impeachment process for 
discipline and removal of federal judges.16 One such proposal, S. 1423, 
the Judicial Tenure Act, 17 would create a special court offederaljudges to 
handle disciplinary problems. The bill gives illustrations of bad behavior 
which include "wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to 
perform duties of the office, habitual intemperance .... " 18 
These developments reflect recognition that some methods of discipline 
are needed. It is not enough to try to select good judges in the first place. 
The main function of discipline and removal-retirement procedures is ''to 
deal with those causes for terminating a judge's ser_vice that develop or 
become manifest only after he has taken office and which could not have 
been detected, or at least were not, at initial selection, i.e., misconduct 
and disability." 19 
As with judicial selection and evaluation, judicial discipline requires 
knowledge of the performance of the individual judge. It is in the area of 
judicial discipline that the need for indentifiability of the judge and his 
record of performance is most dramatically evident. We have no way to 
discipline an entire court. No matter what system of discipline is adopted, 
and regardless of the difficulties in defining misconduct and disability and 
in determining appropriate sanctions, there is a fundamental problem of 
14 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SoCIETY, JUDICIAL DISABILITY AND REMOVAL COMMISSIONS, 
CoURTS AND PROCEDURES (G. Winters & R. Lowe ed. 1973). 
15 JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE 
AND THE STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE OF THE AMERICAN BAR Assoc1-
ATION, PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY (Pre-
liminary Draft August 1977). 
16 These proposals are discussed in Woytash, Who Should Judge the Federal Judges?, 63 
A.B.A.J. 1057 (1977). 
17 S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 379 (1977). 
18 Id. § 382(b). 
19 W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? II (1971). 
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determining when misconduct or inability to perform exists. As the appel-
late judge and his individual work product recede from the view of the 
public, the bar, and the other judges themselves, discovery of misconduct 
or disability becomes increasingly difficult. 
This can be demonstrated by examining the commonly accepted 
grounds for discipline or removal.20 One widely recognized concern is the 
judge who, because of physical or mental disability, is unable to perform 
effectively. A related problem is excessive use of alcohol. We are all 
familiar with examples of judges who develop these infirmities. These 
disabilities are manifest to those with whom the judge has contact. When 
appellate courts adopt procedures which tend to limit the judges' contacts 
with the bar, the public, and even with each other, the disabilities become 
less and less observable. The same is true with respect to poor judicial 
demeanor on the bench which may signal deeper deficiencies in fairness 
and impartiality. 
A judge who refuses to perform duties, whether because of laziness or 
too many competing outside interests, should be disciplined. But with 
increased isolation and availabilty of auxiliary staff personnel, this prob-
lem too becomes less and less identifiable. The impairment of the system 
remains, but the ability to identify the source of the problem diminishes. 
The existence of disciplinary mechanisms and standards of judicial 
performance are checks on judges' behavior militating toward more dili-
gent and responsible performance. The system lets judges know that 
someone is watching. No matter how we refine our standards and 
methods of discipline, there mustbe something capable of being watched. 
Again, in the language of Justice on Appeal, individuality is an impera-
tive. 
II. DIMINUTION OF JUDICIAL VISIBILITY 
Traditional appellate court procedures gave some assurance that this 
imperative was being met. But the traditional procedures are yielding to 
the demands of volume, and inevitably, some of these assurances are also 
giving way. Four specific trends in recent appellate court operating pro-
cedures serve to illustrate this actual and potential diminution of judicial 
visibility. They are reduction in oral argument; use of central staff; 
changes in the form of opinions; and reduction in conferences among 
judges themselves. For purposes of identifying their effect on visibility, 
the pros and cons need not be considered; brief identification will do. 
A. Reduction of Oral Argument 
Oral argument has been a major casualty of the response to volume. An 
argument of one-half hour per side is now considered lengthy. Many 
2° For a concise and useful analysis of these grounds, see Frankel,Judicial Discipline and 
Removal, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1117 (1966). 
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courts are eliminating it in large numbers of cases.21 Yet oral argument is 
almost the only time in which appellate judges appear publicly in the 
official performance of their duties. Fairness, demeanor, knowledge of 
the law, familiarity with the specific problems of individual litigants, and 
compassion are all observaole in oral argument and are otherwise 
obscured from view in the appellate system. 
For the litigant, oral argument provides the only visible assurance that a 
judge is paying attention. For the bar, it provides an opportunity for 
personal contact and persuasion. For the judge, it is the only opportunity 
to ask questions and to hear the answers of those presumably most 
familiar with and interested in the case, the counsel involved. "[W]ithout 
[oral argument], the judge is isolated from all but a limited group of 
subordinates."22 It is the only occasion when the judges responsible for a 
decision "address themselves together and in public view. " 23 
Personal contact between judges and lawyers is important. In the 
absence of oral argument, the process of deciding appeals becomes a 
never-ending progression of pieces of paper, judges become faceless to 
the interested bar, and, just as significantly perhaps, large elements of 
that bar become faceless to the judges. 
Such anonymity contributes to the bureaucratization not only of the 
courts but of law offices as well. In large jurisdictions, small armies of 
lawyers may be involved in criminal appellate litigation, for both the 
prosecution and the criminal defendants, with only the rarest opportunity 
to appear publicly on the record on briefs for which they are responsible. 
The moment of oral argument, subject to questions, gives the lawyer the 
opportunity to stand up and be counted. 
The value of oral argument as an institution is widely recognized.24 But 
practical problems exist. Unlimited oral argument for every case is im-
possible in many appellate courts. No matter how well prepared the 
bench and the bar, there will inevitably be cases in which oral argument is 
not profitable, e.g., where the legal issue has recently been decided in 
another case, where there has been patent and glaring error below, or 
where the appeal is taken to satisfy the obligation of counsel to an indigent 
21 JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 16-17; HAWORTH, ScREENING AND SUMMARY 
PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL 257, 265 (1973). 
22 JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 17. 
23 Jd. 
24 Id. at 17-18; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.35 at 56-57. The American Bar 
Association has publicly opposed the drastic curtailment or total elimination of oral argu-
ment which has occurred in certain United States Courts of Appeals. ABA Resolution 
(August 1974). Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, as well as the ABA Com-
mission on Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, have recognized, however, that in some 
cases it is not useful. JusTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 21 (appellate court should invite 
waiver of oral argument when case for appellant is hopeless or unanswerable or when 
parties' briefs are complete and sufficient). ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.35 at 56-57 
(court may deny oral argument when it appears from summary review of the briefs and 
record of the case that court's deliberation would not be significantly aided by oral argu-
ment; parties can submit statement of reasons why argument should be allowed). 
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defendant and is acknowledged as hopeless. 25 We must also recognize 
that some courts take in a wide geographic jurisdiction where both coun-
sel and judges are scattered. In such jurisdictions, the costs of oral 
argument in terms of both time and money in many cases outweigh its 
value. 
Assuming that our most congested appellate courts cannot have oral 
argument in all cases, or at least in all cases in which there is anything to 
argue about, then serious thought must be given to the selection of cases 
to be argued. Which cases benefit most from oral argument and which do 
not? The tendency has been to retreat from oral argument in matters 
which do not involve complex issues. More routine cases involving sim-
ple but recurrent problems should also be heard. 
The dissatisfactions with traditional oral argument in today's pressured 
world are real. Complaints of unpreparedness come from both sides of the 
bench. Some useful suggestions have been made to improve that situa-
tion. For example, the ABA Standards recommend that the judges confer 
prior to argument and inform counsel of particular areas of concern to the 
court.26 We should also consider adjusting the traditional format of oral 
argument to enhance interchange between the court and counsel, and 
perhaps between counsel themselves. We should not be slaves to the 
format of opening, answer, and rebuttal. 27 
B. Use of Central Legal Staff 
Appellate judges have traditionally had the services of individual law 
clerks, generally very recent graduates, serving for a limited period of 
time and responsible solely to the individual judge. In recent years, many 
appellate courts have employed a central staff of lawyers who serve in a 
capacity unlike the individual judge's law clerk. The central staff is 
responsible to the court as a whole rather than to a specific judge and is 
intended to serve in a more permanent and independent capacity. Staff 
utilization has received much attention. It has been a particular interest of 
Professor Meador. 28 
While central staff attorneys can function as valuable auxiliaries to the 
court, there is as yet no universal wisdom on what functions they can best 
perform.29 Justice on Appeal, for example, recommends that staff screen 
2
• On the last point, see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See note 24 supra. 
28 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.34 at 54-55. For a discussion of the ways in which 
an appellate court can direct the conduct of oral argument, see Conford, Management of the 
Oral Argument by an Appellate Court, 14 JUDGE'S J. 14 (1975). 
27 This and other suggestions for experimentation are offered in Leventhal, Appellate 
Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 432, 445-47 
(1976). 
28 D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS-STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF CHANGE 
(1974). Professor Meador also compares the duties and functions of a law clerk with those of 
a staff attorney. Id. at 112-20. 
29 Appropriate utilization of staff may vary from court to court. A discussion of large staff 
functioning in a congested intermediate appellate court is contained in Lesinski & 
Stockmeyer, Jr., Prehearing Research and Screening in the Michigan Court of Appeals: 
One Court's Method for Increasing Judicial Productivity, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1211 (1973). 
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cases to select those which can be easily disposed of on issues of little or 
no precedential significance, and that staff then prepare memoranda con-
taining a proposed disposition of the cases.30 The ABA Standards em-
phasize the subordinate position of staff and warns against relying on staff 
in the decisional process.31 
There is, however, general agreement that the use of staff creates a risk 
of overdelegation of decisional responsibility to the detriment of the 
administration of justice. Judges should not be rubber stamps for staff 
decisions.32 Institutional controls onjudges ·which depend so much upon 
individual responsibility and public accountability and visibility do not 
exist for staff. Staff attorneys are not selected either by a popular election 
or by appointment of another branch of government; they are appointed 
by the court and generally serve at its pleasure. Staff attorneys are wholly 
unknown .outside the court and generally take no action which is ever a 
matter of public record. 
Discussion of staff function in a state court of last resort is found in Cameron, The Central 
Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465 (1976). The National 
Center for State Courts had done studies of court operations in several jurisdictions with 
particular emphasis on appropriate use of staff. The studies include NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
STATE CoURTS, THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL (Pub. No. R0013 1974); NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT ON THE APPELLATE PROCESS IN ALABAMA (Summary) 
(Pub. No. R0006a 1973); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, WISCONSIN APPELLATE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE STUDY (Pub. No. R0021 1975). 
30 JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note l, 48-55, 227-28. 
31 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 3.62 at 96-99. 
32 /d.; see JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note l, at 46-48. One commentator has stated that, 
while a judge may delegate summary and memorandum draft opinions having no lawmaking 
effect to a staff attorney or to a law clerk, a judge should never delegate "the two inherent 
functions of the appellate decisional process: (I) assuring justice ... and (2) keeping the law 
in order." R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
Dean Erwin Griswold, in an address at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference in May 1977, 
expressed the bar's concern about judicial delegation of decisional responsibility in vivid 
and personal terms: 
When I was Solicitor G~neral, it was one of my responsibilities to review every 
decision which the government lost in any court-except where double jeopardy 
prevented further action. I well remember a case from this Circuit where an opinion 
was written by a law clerk, with findings of fact, and designated as written by a law 
clerk, with his name.,To this was attached a statement to the effect that "The 
foregoing findings and opinion are adopted as the findings and opinion of the court. 
A.B.C., U.S.D.J." I must say that startled me. I know the young men and women 
just out of law school. I have high regard for them. They are able and industrious. 
But they are inexperienced-in the law and in life. And they have not been through 
the mill. They have not been appointed by the President after confirmation by the 
Senate. It is not enough to say that the Judge approved what the law clerk had 
done. Any lawyer knows that the man who does the actual drafting can have great 
influence on the effect of what is drafted. 
Let me give credit to that U.S. District Judge. At least he was candid, and made 
explicit what he was doing, so it could be criticized. It makes me wonder though 
how often the same thing happens without disclosing what has actually happened. 
If the fact is that many fundamental judicial decisions are in fact being made by 
beginners in the law-though with judicial oversight and blessings-it may well be 
that the quality of our justice has been impaired. 
Report of the Task Force on Appellate Procedure to ABA President Justin Stanley 16-17 
(June 1977). 
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More subtle factors may also come into play. We have as yet no very 
sophisticated techniques for evaluating whether individual staff attorneys 
are performing well. When staff attorneys are called upon to make rec-
ommendations as to disposition or to write proposed decisions, there is a 
ten~ency to measure their performance by the extent to which the court 
adopts their proposed decisions. As Professor Meador warns, a high 
degree of court agreement with staff may indicate that staff is doing a 
good job, but it may also indicate that the court is overly relying on and 
delegating to staff. 33 Moreover, measuring staff performance on court 
acceptance may lead to staff recommendations based not on independent 
analysis and judgment but on the staffs prediction oJ what the court will 
wish to decide in that type of case. Fresh thought is discounted, and 
existing biases of the court are reinforced. 
Effective participation of staff is possible in every stage of the appellate 
process, from determining the existence of jurisdiction at an early stage of 
the appeal to participation in formulation of the court's actual decision. At 
the utter extreme of delegation, some courts assign to staff, before oral 
argument or any conference of the judges, the task of preparing a draft 
opinion setting forth fully the facts, reasoning, and disposition of the case 
in a form which the judges may then adopt or reject. If it is rejected, either 
the judge or the staff attorney must start over from scratch. The risk of 
rubber stamping is great; the reliance of the court on arguments of counsel 
and the views of other members of the court is reduced. If the opinion of 
the staff is adopted by the court in a per curiam opinion, then no indi-
vidual judge even appears to take principal responsibility for what is 
written. Judicial responsibility and visible participation are at least in-
creased in the courts which assign staff to p_repare decisions after the 
judges have already heard argument and conferred as to the result and the 
reasons for it. 
We should also work toward more staff visibility. Staff attorneys may 
be anonymous and invisible to the public, but they need not be to the 
judges themselves. Staff attorneys should participate in court conferences 
on cases in which they have been involved. The bar cannot know indi-
vidual staff attorneys, but the bar can become familiar with the functions 
that they perform in a given court. Internal court procedures describing 
the functions of staff attorneys should be published. The American Bar 
Association's Appellate Judge's Conference has recently established the 
National Committee of Appellate Court Staff Counsel. It is hoped that 
this organization can promote interchange between staff attorneys and 
judges in different jurisdictions. Staff should also be encouraged to be 
active in bar activities and to contribute to legal publications. 
C. Changes in the Form of Opinions 
Traditionally, decisions at the first level of appeal have been rendered 
in signed, published opinions setting forth the reasons for decision in the 
33 D. MEADOR, supra note 28, at 131. 
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particular case and establishing precedent for future cases. That tradi-
tional practice has been eroded in recent years by a number of develop-
ments. 
First, many courts are no longer publishing all their decisions and 
dispose of many cases with unpublished opinions or memorandum deci-
sions. This practice is usually accompanied by a rule that the decisions 
cannot be cited as precedent. 34 The underlying premises are that many 
cases do not involve issues of precedential significance, and the reasons 
for their disposition need not be preserved for posterity in the reporter 
system. The amount of time needed for the court to write formal, pub-
lished decisions and for lawyers to read them is too great to justify a 
published opinion in every case. 
A price is paid in terms of diminished visibility of court decisions, 
however, since unpublished opinions are seen only by those immediately 
concerned. There is also a related fear that nonpublication and noncita-
tion will result in a court's hiding difficult cases by failing to publish 
significant rulings. A recent study by the National Center for State Courts 
on California's use of memorandum decision device indicates, however, 
that this is not happening. 35 
Although there is some loss of visibility when decisions are not pub-
lished, the decision is still available to the parties and to the public in 
court records. So long as the decisiori states the reasons for the result, 
there is still accountability to the parties of the case. When, however, the 
decision takes a form which contains no explanation and consists simply 
of a one-word statement of affirmance, 36 then the loss to the system is of a 
vastly greater dimension. 
It is true that the process of explaining a decision is time consuming, 
but as a force to insure responsible action by the court, it has no match. 
More than that, it is an important and visible reassurance to litigants that 
someone has looked at the case and attempted to understand the positions 
being asserted. When a case has not been orally argued, it is the only 
assurance. 3 7 
34 E.g., 9rH CIR. R. 21. See also the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice's proposed 
rule on the use of unpublished d1:cisions. REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVIS-
ORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE PRACTICES, INCLUDING SAN DIEGO CONFERENCE REPORTS 
61-63 (1975). 
35 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT ON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE 
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS 15-16 (1976), reported in Mueller, Unpublished Opinion 
Study, I ST. CouRT J. 23 (Summer 1977); see also, Frank, Remarks before the Ninth Circuit 
Judicial Conference, 16 JUDGE'S J. IO (1977). 
36 See e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 21, adopted in 1970, which lists the circumstances in which such a 
decision can be issued in that overworlced jurisdiction. These circumstances include a 
disposition where the district court's judgment is based on findings which are not clearly 
erroneous, where a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and where no error of 
law appears. 
37 The ABA Standards favor the use of reasoned decisions. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 
2, § 3.36(b) at 58. The authors of Justice on Appeal have also called for reasoned opinions: 
"Every decision on the merits should be accompanied by a statement of reasons sufficient to 
demonstrate that in deciding the case the judges have taken due account of the issues and the 
law." JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note l, at 226. 
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D. Elimination of Court Conferences 
The recent tendency of appellate courts to limit conferences among the 
judges to decide cases is a reaction similar to the reduction of oral 
argument. As more and more cases need to be decided, the reaction is to 
spend less time talking about each case. As a result, many courts are not 
having any formal discussion of cases prior to their disposition. Here 
again, as Justice on Appeal points out, the impact on visible, responsible 
decision-making is real: "The conference is an important assurance of 
collegiality and also reinforces the individual judge's sense of personal 
responsibility. " 38 Moreover, the conference forces judges to justify their 
thinking to each other. As the pressure of volume decreases the judge's 
visibility to the public, litigants, and the bar, conferences may take on 
added significance. They at least assure that members of the court do not 
become invisible to each other. There may be many ways of conducting 
conferences, including conference by telephone, "[b]ut practically 
everyone agrees that individual drafting of opinions and negotiation for 
signatures, without regular conference discussion, is totally unaccepta-
ble. " 39 
The need for efficiency has brought changes in all of tl_le areas dis-
cussed. Each of these changes in varying degrees adversely affects the 
individual accountability of the judge. The harsh reality is that if all 
appellate courts were to take extreme measures in all of these areas, the 
visibility of the judge would disappear entirely. Thus, if a court were to 
eliminate oral argument in all cases, rely on staff to draft all decisions, 
never confer as to what the decision should be, and then announce them 
in one sentence without explanation or justification, visible and responsi-
ble justice could be eliminated. 
I do not predict that anything approaching that grim spectre is im-
mediate; the judge will not disappear as a recognizable feature of the 
appellate landscape. There will be oral arguments in some cases; judges 
will continue to confer with each other about some problems; not all 
matters will be able to be handled by staff; and judges will continue to 
play a major role in the formulation of significant opinions. But invisibility 
is the trend. '" 
In courts faced with rising pressures of volume, the judge may already 
be invisible in large numbers of cases. This is one inevitable tendency of 
screening to sort out cases for summary disposition.40 In each case that is 
38 JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 29. 
39 B.L. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 56, at 10 (1977). 
•° For a survey of the screening methods used in the Federal Courts of Appeal, see D. 
MEADOR, supra note 28, at 231-39. Some courts have adopted sophisticated rules and 
procedures to classify cases into categories according to different degrees of dispositional 
treatment. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has a summary calendar where cases are placed 
after briefing. This procedure is established by the Fifth Circuit's Rule 18, 5TH CIR. R. 18, 
and was originally described in Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 409 F.2d 804, 805-08 (5th 
Cir. 1969). The Court's discussion of the procedures under Rule 18 was updated in Huth v. 
334 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 11:3 
screened at an early stage by staff and placed on a conveyor belt for 
disposition without oral argument, without oral conference, without rea-
soned disposition, there are no visible assurances of judicial participation. 
III. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES TO PROMOTE VISIBILITY 
Even in the most congested courts, it is not necessary to eliminate so 
many assurances of visibility in so many cases. We need conscious 
experimentation to test to what extent timesaving measures can be used 
in combination with traditional safeguards. An example of such ex-
perimentation is the Arizona Appellate Project. 41 The results of the exper-
iment strongly suggest that a majority of appeals can be resolved soon 
after trial without full transcripts and without lengthy formal written 
briefs, but with heavy emphasis on oral argument. 
The experiment utilized approximately seventy-five civil cases which 
had proceeded to judgment in the trial court. Three practicing lawyers, 
previously totally uninvolved in the litigation, assumed the role of appel-
late judges and heard oral argument from counsel for the parties very soon 
after the judgment. The simulated appellate panel had the benefit of 
postjudgment motions of counsel, a summary memorandum prepared by 
a law student from the file in the case, as well as the argument of the 
lawyers. At the conclusion of the argument, the panel determined how it 
would decide the case. The reactions of all the participants, panelists and 
advocates, were recorded on confidential questionnaires. 
The procedures being tested departed from the traditional method of 
appellate review in several significant respects. First, there was no tran-
script. Second, there were no formal briefs, but only summary 
memoranda filed by the parties. Third, the oral argument was informal 
and subject to no time limitations. Fourth, the proceedings took place 
within only a few weeks of the trial court's decision. 
The results showed that the panelists were able to decide a majority of 
the cases, seventy-five percent, and give reasons for their decisions. They 
also showed that the participants, both the members of the panel and the 
arguing counsel, believed that the oral argument and limited written 
materials were adequate or more than adequate to reach a fair decision. A 
modified form of the Arizona Project procedures has been approved for 
actual implementation in Colorado.42 
In terms of insuring visibility of the judges, the experimental procedure 
has several advantages. First, it insures that there will be oral argument 
Southern Pacific Co., 417 F.2d 526, 527-30 (5th Cir. 1969), and in Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 431 F.2d 409, 410-14 (5th Cir. 1970). The Tenth Circuit 
places cases in one of four categories on the basis of a docketing statement submitted prior 
to briefing. lOTH CIR. R. 9. 
•• The operation and results of the experiment are described in Jacobson & Schroeder, 
Arizona's Experiment with Appellate Reform, 63 A.B.A.J. 1226 (1977). Judge Jacobson and 
I served as co-chairmen of the Arizona Appellate Project. 
42 CAB Judiciary Section's Proposed Expedited Appeal Process, 6 COLO. LAW. 1133 
(1977). 
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and places that oral argument shortly after the trial when the case is 
freshest in the minds of counsel. It permits the court itself to confer after 
the argument and to decide whether the case is ripe for disposition or 
whether additional work on the part of staff, counsel, or judges is needed. 
In other words, it permits the court itself to screen the cases. At the same 
time, it allows utilization of staff both to summarize the case for the court 
prior to argument and to work at the court's direction after the judges 
have evaluated the case in the light of the written submissions and 
argument. This emphasis on interchange between court and counsel and 
between judges themselves is in sharp contrast with the invisible justice to 
which modern practice is tending. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This is an era of ferment. As we continue adapting our appellate 
procedures to the demands of a more crowded, a more complicated, and a 
more litigious age, we must assess not only the gains which we are 
achieving in efficiency, but the losses we suffer in terms of visibility and 
responsibility. Volume must not be allowed to reduce the judge to a kind 
of anonymous traffic manager for cases, a squad leader for an unknown 
staff. We must be able to see what judges are doing before we can know 
that we are achieving justice on appeal. 
